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Abstract
We study how educational attainment and school enrollment status differentially affect
Black and White teen part-time employment in the context of No Pass, No Drive policies.
These policies require that teens maintain enrollment and regular attendance in school in order
to hold a driver’s license, and previous research (Barua and Vidal-Fernandez 2014; Kennedy
2020) shows they cause large increases in school enrollment and educational attainment. Using
difference-in-differences estimation, we find that No Pass, No Drive policies cause a 5 percentage
point increase in Black teen part-time employment, but do not cause an associated change in
White teen employment. Rather, this increase in Black teen part-time employment is offset
by a 1.7 percentage point decrease in part-time employment for White young adults (aged 18-
25). Event study specifications show that these patterns are driven by long-term compositional
changes in the young adult workforce. There are no immediate effects of No Pass, No Drive
policies on employment, but these policies cause an increase in the educational attainment of
teens, who then become less likely to accept part-time work as young adults. This evidence
suggests substantial “crowding out” of Black teens by young adults in part-time work, and that
efforts to promote full-time work or post-secondary school attendance for young adults may




In the United States, 26.4 percent of all teens aged 16 or 17 participate in the labor force, ac-
counting for nearly 2 million jobs.1 Despite the large size of teen labor markets, many conventional
questions in labor economics have been understudied in the context of teen labor markets. The
effects of minimum wages have been the primary focus of economists on teen labor markets, likely
because teen labor markets are dissimilar from other labor markets; teen employment is largely in
low-skilled, low-paid, part-time, temporary jobs that are unlike the conventional labor market for
adults.2 In this study, we examine how educational attainment and access to transportation af-
fect Black-White employment differentials and racial discrimination in teen labor markets, looking
specifically at No Pass, No Drive policies in the US.
No Pass, No Drive (NPND) policies are widespread, low-cost policies that have been imple-
mented in 28 states since 1988. These policies mandate that teens fulfill school-related requirements
in order to legally hold a driver’s license. In this study, we focus solely on the largest group of NPND
policies, which Kennedy (2020) classifies as “Enrollment-based policies.” Enrollment-based poli-
cies require that teens remain in school and regularly attend (typically at least 90% attendance
required) to legally hold a driver’s license while under the age of 18. These policies have been
shown by Kennedy (2020), Barua and Vidal-Fernandez (2014), and Krimmel (2000) to increase the
likelihood that teens remain in school. We use difference-in-differences estimation to identify the
effects of Enrollment-based policies on teen employment, exploiting the rollout of these policies over
20 states and 25 years. Combining increased school enrollment with the revocation of licenses for
teens who do not comply with NPND policies (i.e. truant and dropout students), we would expect
that Enrollment-based NPND policies reduce teen employment.
Instead, we find that Enrollment-based policies cause a 0.7 percentage point increase, though
statistically insignificant, in teen part-time employment, with no associated decrease in teen full-
1Source: Current Population Survey 2018
2See Brozen (1969), Wellington (1991), Portugal and Cardoso (2006), Giuliano (2013), and many others for
minimum wage studies focusing primarily on teen labor markets.
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time employment. Furthermore, we find this gain in part-time employment is only realized by Black
teens; Black teen part-time employment increases by 5 percentage points, with no decrease in White
teen part-time employment. Given that NPND policies should not increase overall labor supply
or demand, we look at the effects of NPND policies on young adult employment. After the first
few years of a NPND policy, young adults were treated by the policy as teens, so NPND policies
may be causing compostional changes in the youth labor force. We find that young adult part-
time employment (ages 18-24) decreases by 1.4 percentage points due to NPND policies. Further
investigating by race as before, we find that this reduction in part-time employment comes entirely
from White young adults – we find null effects for Black young adult part-time employment, and,
if anything, positive effects on Black full-time employment. Event studies show that none of these
effects occur immediately, but rather begin 2-5 years after the implementation of a NPND policy.
Taking all of these results together, our findings suggest that NPND policies reduce Black-White
teen employment gaps not by causing Black teens to displace White teens from part-time jobs, but
rather by causing Black teens to fill part-time jobs left vacant by White young adults, who increased
their educational attainment due to the NPND policy and no longer participate in the part-time
labor market. This has important implications for our understanding of racial dynamics in the
youth labor force. There is a small literature on racial discrimination and disparities in teen labor
markets. Derenoncourt and Montialoux (2020) study the effects of minimum wages on racial dis-
parities, showing that the expansion of industries covered by the minimum wage in the 1966 Fair
Labor Standards Act explains over 20% of the decrease in the Black-White wage gap during the
Civil Rights Era. They do not focus solely on teen employment, but teen workers make up a large
portion of their affected sample. Additional studies in urban economics show that spatial mismatch
and job accessibility decrease Black teen employment, such as Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1990), Lar-
son and Mohanty (1999), and O’Regan and Quigley (1996). However, issues with education and
discrimination also certainly exist in teen labor markets, and are important to our understanding
of low-skilled and part-time work as well as the opportunity costs of secondary education. Nu-
merous studies have shown that Black-White wage and employment differentials have stagnated or
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even widened since the 1980s (Bound and Freeman, 1992; Chandra, 2000; Johnson and Neal, 1997;
Rivkin, 1995; Bayer and Charles, 2018). Our results suggest that in teen labor markets, comparing
employment effects between Black teens and White teens overlooks an important friction. Black
teens appear to be crowded out of the labor market by White young adults, and NPND policies
reduce these barriers by converting some White high school dropouts into high school graduates,
opening up low-skill, part-time jobs that Black teens can easily fill.
2 Background
2.1 No Pass, No Drive Policies
Since 1987, there have been 28 states that have passed a No Pass, No Drive policy, tying teens’
driver’s licenses to their educational choices. Following Kennedy (2020), we categorize these laws
into 3 groups based on their targeted educational outcomes. Enrollment-based policies, in 20 states,
require that teens under age 18 maintain current school enrollment and abide by the school atten-
dance laws of their states in order to maintain a driver’s license – both high school dropouts and
truant teens have their licenses revoked under these policies. Truancy-based policies, in 5 states,
only require that teens satisfy their state’s school attendance law in order to maintain a driver’s
license. This means that a truant teen (i.e. one who is skipping school) is penalized under these
laws. However, a legal dropout would not be penalized under these laws; potentially, truant teens
who had their licenses revoked could instead drop out of school altogether and have their licenses
reinstated. Behavior-based policies, in 5 states, target teen behavior – primarily crime (either at
school or in general) or non-criminal violations resulting in school suspension. The policies are
listed in Table 1, reproduced from Kennedy (2020).
Twenty-six No Pass, No Drive (NPND) policies are currently ongoing; Delaware’s was repealed
in 2018, and Kentucky’s was temporarily halted by their Supreme Court. There is heterogeneity
in exemptions to these policies, shown in Table 1, but we do not exploit this variation because it
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is unclear how widely these exemptions were enforced and utilized and whether other states had
similar exemptions. Additionally, there is heterogeneity in the reporting mechanisms used in these
states; for example, Kentucky uses an automatic electronic reporting system where students who
drop out of school or fall below the minimum attendance threshold are “flagged” in the system and
a notice is immediately sent to the state licensing office. Texas, however, requires teens submit a
form to the licensing office each year signed by their school’s registrar stating the teen has met all
of the attendance requirements over the previous year. Due to the subjective nature of attempting
to categorize these systems, and due to uncertainty in how electronic reporting systems were im-
plemented over time, we also do not exploit variation in reporting systems.
2.2 No Pass, No Drive Literature
To our knowledge, only five empirical studies have been performed on No Pass, No Drive poli-
cies, mostly studying educational outcomes. Krimmel (2000) studies the initial rollout of the policy
in Kentucky, where counties could opt-in to the policy for the first few years of the policy’s life.
He shows that counties enacting Kentucky’s Enrollment-based NPND policy saw an initial 11 per-
cent reduction in the dropout rate, compared to an 8 percent reduction in counties choosing not
to implement the policy. This is consistent with the mechanisms we discuss in our study, where
“marginal dropouts” delay their dropout decision, at least temporarily, under Enrollment-based
NPND policies.
Barua and Vidal-Fernandez (2014) study NPND policies on a national level, looking at high
school completion, completed grades, and some student time use outcomes. They find that years of
schooling increased by 0.05, and the probability of graduating high school increased by 1 percent-
age point. They also look at the Monitoring the Future teen time use survey, and find that NPND
policies reduce the probability of skipping school (-1.8%), increase weekly hours of homework (+0.2
hours), reduce weekly working hours (-0.1 hours), increase the proportion of teens with licenses
(+0.7%), and marginally decrease the probability of having a traffic accident (-1.6%). Barua and
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Vidal-Fernandez (2016) study the effects of NPND policies on juvenile crime, finding that NPND
policies cause declines in violent, property, and drug crimes among teenage males. Additionally,
Gilpin (2019) finds that NPND policies decrease traffic fatalities by 7.3%, mostly through incapac-
itation effects.
Our analysis differs along a few key dimensions. First, our data is representative of all teenagers,
while the Monitoring the Future survey used by Barua and Vidal-Fernandez (2014) is only repre-
sentative of teen high school students, and does not include any high school dropouts. Given that all
education-related papers in the NPND literature show that NPND policies cause marginal dropouts
to change their decisions, it is crucial to include high school dropouts in our sample to avoid selec-
tion issues. This issue is most easily seen in Barua and Vidal-Fernandez’s result on the proportion
of teens with driver’s licenses – NPND policies increase the proportion of teens with a driver’s
license by 0.7 percentage points among teens enrolled in school, but the NPND policies, if enforced,
revoke the driver’s licenses of teen dropouts. Given that 5-10% of all teens drop out of high school,
Enrollment-based NPND policies would only need to revoke the licenses of one fifth of all dropouts
to cancel out the increase shown by Barua and Vidal-Fernandez. Second, we categorize NPND
policies into three groups based on their targeted educational outcomes, as mentioned in the previ-
ous section. Given that the three policies have different effects on educational outcomes, they will
presumably have different effects on teen behavior as well.
The final study on NPND policies is Kennedy (2020), which studies how NPND policies affect
their targeted educational outcomes, and demonstrates the unique education policy environment we
exploit in our study. He studies how NPND policies affect retention and dropout behavior, showing
that Enrollment-based NPND policies cause a false reduction in many common graduation rate
estimates, caused by a 2.8 percentage point increase in 9th grade enrollment. Enrollment-based
policies increase school enrollment by causing marginal dropouts to repeat the 9th grade instead
of dropping out of school. Truancy-based policies have an near-opposite effect – these policies in-
duce students to drop out of school by revoking the driver’s licenses of truant teens. The annual
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event dropout rate increases by 1.4 to 2 percentage points, and 11th grade enrollment decreases,
corresponding to teens dropping out of school at the first available opportunity. Enrollment-based
policies have little effect on late high school enrollment, causing large increases in 9th and 10th grade
enrollment, while Truancy-based policies have no effect on early high school enrollment, causing
large decreases in 11th and 12th grade enrollment and graduation. Overall, both Barua and Vidal-
Fernandez (2014) and Kennedy (2020) show that Enrollment-based NPND policies cause marginal
high school dropouts to instead remain in school, with simultaneous increases in educational at-
tainment and grade retention occurring as a result.
3 Data and Methods
3.1 Data
Information on when each state enacted NPND policies is taken from Kennedy (2020). Details
including the date of implementation and the categorization of policies are originally from each
state’s code of laws and legislative histories. We use teen and adult employment data from the
Current Population Survey (CPS) cross-sectional data, omitting Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington
DC.
There are about 260,000 teenagers aged 15 to 17 between 1985 and 2014. We focus on teens
aged 15 to 17 because NPND policies only directly apply to these age groups. We also restrict
our sample to avoid temporary summer work; a teen is employed if the number of weeks worked
in the past year is more than 16. Since teens are usually employed part-time, we also separately
investigate the effects of NPND policies on full-time and part-time employment. A teen is full-
time employed if they worked more than 30 hours per week and more than 16 weeks in the past
year, and is part-time employed if they worked more than 16 weeks but less than 30 hours per week.
Panel A of Table 2 reports summary statistics of our teen employment sample, regardless of
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school enrollment status. About 27% of teens have a job, of whom 25% are employed full-time and
75% are employed part-time.3 About 12% of teens are Black and 81% are White in the sample,
which is consistent with the racial composition of the overall population. There is a large gap be-
tween Black and White teen employment. 30% of White teens are employed, twice the employment
to population ratio of Black teens. Among employed White teens, 76% are employed part-time and
24% are full-time, compared to 69% and 31% for Black teens, respectively. Among those employed,
Black teens are less likely to be employed part-time than White teens.
Since high school students and dropouts likely face different labor market conditions, Panel B
of Table 2 reports summary statistics of teen employment by high school enrollment status. In the
CPS, a teen was enrolled in high school full-time if in the previous year they were enrolled in high
school or college full-time, enrolled in college part-time, or did not attend school but had already
completed high school. Otherwise, they were considered high school dropouts.
About 93% of teens aged 15 to 17 are enrolled in high school full-time, while 7% had dropped
out of high school. Only 5% of high school students are employed full-time, which is consistent with
our expectation that high school students are have less available time for full-time work. About 21%
of high school students have a part-time job. High school dropout teens, on the other hand, are less
time-constrained than high school students, especially for full-time jobs. High school dropout teens
are 6 p.p. more likely to hold a job than non-dropouts. 21% of dropouts are employed full-time
and 11% are employed part-time. Similar patterns hold by race. Both White and Black high school
students are more likely to hold part-time jobs and less likely to hold full-time jobs than their high
school dropout counterparts. However, for those with the same school enrollment status, Black
teens are less likely to have jobs than White teens. While 29% of White high school students hold
jobs, only 14% of Black students are employed.
In our analysis, we control for state-level time-varying characteristics that may be related to the
3All statistics in Panel A are based on the total teen population of the corresponding category. 20.67% of teens
are employed part-time, which is 75% of all employed teens.
8
enactment and effects of NPND policies. Teen population by sex and by race is from the Survey
of Epidemiology and End Results (SEER) U.S. State and County Population data. State average
income and unemployment rate are collected from the US Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) respectively. Summary statistics for these data are reported in Panel C of Table 2
The teen labor market overlaps with the adult labor market, especially for young adults who
were recently affected by No Pass No Drive policies. Therefore, NPND policies may also affect the
young adult labor market. In the CPS, an adult is employed full-time if they are employed and
their reported usual hours worked per week are greater than 35 hours, and are employed part-time
if they are employed and their usual hours worked per week are less than 35 hours.
Panel A in Table 3 reports summary statistics of employment status for young adults aged 18-
25. About 54% of young adults are employed full-time and 25% are employed part-time. 16% more
young men than women are employed full-time and 8% more young women than men are employed
part-time. Black young adults are 10% less likely to hold a full-time job and 4% less likely to hold
a part-time job than White young adults. Thus the overall employment rate of Black young adults
is 14% lower than for White young adults.
Barua and Vidal-Fernandez (2014) and Kennedy (2020) find that NPND policies increase edu-
cational attainment, which will likely further affect labor market outcomes. In Panel B of Table 3,
we report summary statistics of young adult employment by educational attainment. Individuals
whose highest years of schooling completed was 12 or above are considered high school graduates;
otherwise, they are high school dropouts.4
About 64% of high school dropouts are employed, which is 17% lower than for those who have
completed high school. For both White and Black, young adult high school graduates are more
likely to be full-time and part-time employed. However, regardless of educational attainment, White
4People who completed 12th grade but did not receive diploma are recognized as high school dropouts, and people
whose high school diploma is unclear are dropped.
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young adults are more likely to be employed and employed full-time than Black young adults. The
gap in employment between White and Black young adults is wider for high school dropouts.
3.2 Methods
We perform difference-in-differences estimation with two-way fixed effects to identify the causal
effect of No Pass, No Drive policies on employment using the estimating equation below:
Employmenti,s,t =α+ βPoliciess,t + δt + λs + θXi,s,t + εi,s,t (1)
In the equation above, the outcome variables are binary indicators for whether an individual
is employed, employed full-time, or employed part-time. The subscript i indexes survey respon-
dents, s indexes states and t indexes year. The term Policiess,t is a dummy variable containing
our three NPND policy categories, and is equal to 1 if state s has a policy in year t. Xi,s,t in-
cludes controls varying at the individual and state-year level – these include race, gender and age
at the individual level, and log median income, unemployment rate, and log teen population (ages
15-17) at the state-year level. We include state and year fixed effects (λs and δt, respectively) to
control for unobserved time invariant characteristics of each state, and national time-varying trends.
To examine racial differences of the effects of NPND policies on teen employment, we perform
analogous estimation by adding interaction terms between NPND policies and race. So we modify
our estimating equation as:
Employmenti,s,t =α+ βPoliciess,t + ψPoliciess,t ×Blacki + δt + λs + θXi,s,t + εi,s,t (2)
Outcome variables and controls in Xi,s,t are the same as in Equation (1). The term Blacki is
a dummy variable equal to 1 for Black individuals. In addition, we examine the dropout decisions
10
of teens to verify if our results are consistent with the literature and to test for differential effects
of NPND policies on high school dropout rates by race. The estimating equations are the same
as Equations (1) and (2), except that the outcome variable is a binary indicator equal to 1 if a
teen is a high school dropout, and equal to 0 if enrolled in high school full-time.5 he effects of
NPND policies on young adult employment are examined using Equation (1), but excluding the
term Unemp. Rates,t.
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As is typical in the difference-in-differences literature, we also estimate a dynamic event study
specification, allowing the effects of NPND policies to vary over time. This specification not only
allows us to test whether pre-existing trends in the outcome were parallel; it also allows us to
examine important dynamics in the effects of NPND policies over time. Although NPND policies
only directly affect teens, after the first few years of the policies’ existence young adults were
affected by NPND policies when they were teens. Given that NPND policies increase educational
attainment and reduce dropout rates (Barua and Vidal-Fernandez, 2014; Kennedy, 2020; Krimmel,
2000), these policies may also affect young adult employment with a 2–5 year lag. A general form





βk✶(NPND Enactment Y ears,t+k)
+ δt + λs + θXi,s,t + εi,s,t
(3)
In Equation (3) we are interested in βk, the dynamic effects of the NPND policy, measured k
years away from the enactment of the policy. We omit k = −1, the year before the policy, and
stack all effects k > 10 and k < −10 into the endpoints, as is standard in the literature. In other
specifications, we are interested in differential dynamic effects by race. To test this, we augment
5Teens aged 15–17 who are enrolled in high school part-time or enrolled in college are excluded from the analysis.
6State-year unemployment rates are highly collinear with adult part-time employment. These are far less corre-
lated with teen employment, as teen labor force participation is lower than adult LFP, is less cyclical, and has mostly
followed a downward trend across our sample.
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βk✶(NPND Enactment Y ears,t+k)
+ γkBlacki × ✶(NPND Enactment Y ears,t+k) )
+ δt + λs + θXi,s,t + εi,s,t
(4)
In Equation (4) the differential effects by race are given by γk – the dynamic treatment effects
for White individuals are equal to βk, while the dynamic treatment for Black individuals are equal
to βk + γk. In both Equations (3) and (4) the variables δt, λs, θ, Xi,s,t, and εi,s,t have the same
meaning as in Equations (1) and (2).
Our identifying assumption throughout is the typical parallel trends assumption – that states
without No Pass, No Drive policies provide a valid counterfactual for the trend that states with
No Pass, No Drive policies would have followed, had they not enacted a policy. Given the identi-
fying assumption holds, our estimates identify the causal effects of No Pass, No Drive policies on
employment.
4 Results
4.1 NPND Effects on Youth Labor Markets, Overall and by Race
No Pass, No Drive policies make it more difficult for teens to receive and maintain a driver’s
license. Barua and Vidal-Fernandez (2014) and Kennedy (2020) show that NPND policies also
cause teens to remain in school for longer than they otherwise would, whether by increasing their
educational attainment or by delaying their eventual dropout decision. A priori we would expect
both of these channels to decrease teen employment; teens who no longer have a driver’s license
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due to an NPND policy face additional costs of commuting to work, and teens who are enrolled in
school have less time available for work than high school dropouts. However, if high school enrolled
teens are preferred by employers to high school dropouts, then NPND policies may increase teen
employment by encouraging high school enrollment. In addition, increasing educational attainment
may cause long-termn compositional changes in low-skill labor markets. Overall, the predicted
effects of NPND policies on teen employment are ambiguous.
Table 4 reports the effects of NPND policies on overall teen employment rates, as well as split by
full- and part-time employment status and by race. Columns (1)-(3) present the effects of NPND
policies on teen employment. We do not find significant effects of NPND policies on teen em-
ployment rates overall. However, we find racial differences in response to NPND policies, shown in
Columns (4)-(6) of Table 4. In all three columns, White teen employment is neither significantly nor
substantially affected, with precisely estimated null effects. However, Black teen employment is sig-
nificantly increased by Enrollment-based NPND policies; overall, Black teen employment increased
by 6.6 percentage points, and part-time Black teen employment increased by 5.3 percentage points
due to the enactment of an Enrollment-based NPND policy.7 About 21 percent of all teens are
employed part-time, amounting to about 75 percent of all employed teens. Our results in Columns
(4)-(6) of Table 4 suggest that the increases in Black teen employment are primarily driven by
increasing Black part-time employment, while White teen employment is not affected.
The underlying assumption of our estimation is the typical parallel trends assumption: that
trends in the teen employment rate in treated states would be parallel to trends in untreated states
in the counterfactual where treatment never occurred. To examine this, Figure 1 reports event
study figures for Columns (4)-(6) in Table 4, from estimating equation (4).8 Panel (a) in Figure 1
shows that both White and Black teens have similar and relatively flat pre-policy trends in overall
employment. After the enactment of NPND policies, the overall employment trend of White teens
7Since Behavior-based policies and Truancy-based policies are relatively rare, bootstrap-based inference procedures
typically fail to reject the null. As a result, we only focus on the effects of the far more common Enrollment-based
policies in this paper.
8Event studies for Columns (1)-(3) in Table 4 are reported in Appendix Figure A1.
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is unaffected. However, the overall employment of Black teens increases over time and is signifi-
cantly different from White teens. In Panel (b) of Figure 1, pre-policy trends of Black and White
teen full-time employment are similar and flat. Full-time employment of Black teens increases after
the NPND policies; but this effect does not grow over time. We do not observe changes in White
teen full-time employment. The trends for White and Black teen part-time employment in Panel
(c) are similar to trends in Panel (a), suggesting that the effect of NPND policies on Black teen
employment is mainly driven by increasing part-time employment. Our results in Columns (4)-(6)
of Table 4 suggest that White and Black teens respond to NPND policies differently.
Many young adults were affected by NPND policies during their teenage years. Since previous
studies have found that NPND policies increase educational attainment, the labor market choices of
young adults who were affected by NPND policies when they in high school may be different from
those who did not. In addition, the NPND policy effects in teen and young adult labor markets
may be interconnected. High school graduates are more likely to find a job and can often find a
better job than high school dropouts. Thus, NPND policies may increase young adult employment
by increasing their educational attainment. As higher education may change individuals’ career
paths by improving their job opportunities, the labor market composition of young adults may be
altered by NPND policies.
Table 5 reports the effects of NPND policies on the employment of young adults aged 18–25.
Columns (1)-(3) show the effects of NPND policies on young adult employment. In Column (1) we
do not find a significant effect of NPND policies on the overall employment rate of young adults.
Column (2) shows that NPND policies increase full-time employment by 1.25 percentage points,
though it is not statistically significant. Column (3) shows that the part-time employment rate
of young adults is significantly decreased by 1.42 percentage points due to NPND policies. For
part-time jobs, there may be competition between teens and young adults. Labor demand for
part-time jobs should be unaffected by NPND policies. Since the part-time employment of White
teens is unaffected by NPND policies, the increasing part-time employment of Black teens can be
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explained by the decreasing part-time employment of young adults. We also test the existence of
racial differences in response to NPND policies among young adults, reported in Columns (4)-(6).
In Column (6), the part-time employment rate of White young adults decreases by 1.74 percentage
points due to NPND policies, while the part-time employment rate of Black young adults is not
affected. In Column (5), we find that the full-time employment rate of White young adults is
unaffected by NPND policies, but the full-time employment rate of Black young adults increases
by 2.52 percentage points. Thus overall, NPND policies decrease the likelihood of holding a job
for White young adults by 1.13 percentage points, and increase the likelihood of holding a job for
Black young adults by 3.54 percentage points.
Figure 2 reports event study figures showing racial differences in response to NPND policies for
young adult employment. In all three panels, White and Black young adults have flat pre-policy
trends. In panel (a), pre-policy trend of White young adults is slightly positive, dropping to zero
post-policy, which results in negative point estimates in Column (4) of Table 5. This pattern is
likely due to our choice of omitted year at t − 1, but is somewhat concerning. In Section 4.3 we
present detrended estimates which should correct for linear pre-policy trends. In panel (b), White
young adult full-time employment no post-policy changes. However, Black young adult full-time
employment trends upward after the policy. This lagged effect of NPND policies on Black young
adults part-time employment is likely caused by the graduation of Black young adults from high
school. In panel (c), part-time employment of White young adults is slightly positive in the pre-
policy periods and around zero in the post-policy periods. Part-time employment of Black young
adults remains near zero before and after the policies.
If NPND policies shift job opportunities between teens and young adults, our results in Tables
4 and 5 would suggest that NPND policies shift part-time jobs from White young adults to Black
teens. However, according to previous studies, the educational attainment of both teens and young
adults who were exposed to NPND policies should be increased by NPND policies. It is unlikely
that employers at part-time jobs would prefer to hire Black teens over White young adults. In
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addition, our results show that full-time employment of Black young adults increases after the
enactment of NPND policies, growing over time. Therefore, NPND policies appear to increase
Black teen part-time employment and Black young adult full-time employment and decrease White
young adult part-time employment by raising educational attainment, resulting in changes in the
composition of the labor force.
4.2 NPND Policies, Educational Attainment, and Employment
To examine these compositional changes in the youth labor force, we test the effects of NPND
policies on the high school dropout rate of teens and young adults.9 In Columns (1) and (2) of
Table 6, we find that NPND policies decreased teen dropout rates by 1.36 percentage points. In
addition, Black teen dropout rates are reduced by 2.37 percentage points. We find similar, but
somewhat larger effects of NPND policies on young adult high school dropout rates in Column (3)
and (4). NPND policies cause a 1.5 percentage point decrease in high school dropout rates for
White young adults, and a 5.4 percentage point decrease for Black young adults, resulting in a 2.6
percentage point reduction overall. For both teens and young adults, NPND policies have larger
effects on educational attainment for Black youths than White youths, consistent with Barua and
Vidal-Fernandez (2014).
NPND policies increase school enrollment for both White and Black teens, but only increase
employment for Black teens. It is unlikely that NPND policies would change labor demand for
teens or young adults. Therefore, based on our findings, NPND policies appear to change the
composition of low wage labor markets so that the policies differentially affect employment by race.
Higher educational attainment due to NPND policies makes White young adults leave part-time
work, either for full-time work or non-labor market activity.
9Here we examine the status dropout rate, the proportion of people who are not enrolled in school. For teens,
this is equal to 1− SchoolEnrollment, and for young adults this is equal to 1−HighSchoolCompletion.
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All of these results together suggest a widespread pattern of racial discrimination. White young
adults are able to find employment regardless of their educational attainment, but Black young
adults appear to only find full-time work if they have High School diplomas. Since NPND policies
cause a large increase in Black high school completion, we see a large increase in Black full-time
employment as well. In addition, employers may only be willing to hire Black teens if they cannot
fill the position with a White young adult or a Black young adult graduate. White young adults
who complete high school due to a NPND policy leave the part-time labor market, leaving positions
open for Black teens to fill. Overall, by increasing youth educational attainment, NPND policies
increase access to employment – directly for Black young adults, and indirectly for Black teens.
4.3 Two-Way Fixed Effects with Staggered Treatment Timing
Many recent studies have cast concern on the two-way fixed effects (TWFE) design when treat-
ment takes the form of a staggered rollout across place and time. In this section, we examine the
major critiques of this growing literature in the context of our study and provide a few robustness
checks verifying the validity of our estimates presented previously in Section 4.
Goodman-Bacon (2018) shows that the TWFE design can be decomposed into a weighted av-
erage of 2x2 difference-in-differences comparisons. However, these comparisons are not necessarily
straightforward, as “already-treated” groups can act as controls for “not-yet-treated” groups, and
mechanically the weight on an individual 2x2 comparison can be negative. We begin by calcu-
lating the weights placed on each of our 2x2 comparisons, using the “bacondecomp” command in
Stata (Goodman-Bacon et al., 2019). Figure 3 shows plots of the weights and the 2x2 difference-
in-differences estimates for all comparisons made in our data.10 Enrollment-based policies have 15
“timing groups” as a few states passed NPND policies simultaneously.
10Since our main object of interest in these regressions is the interaction between Enrollment-based policies and
Black teens, we effectively estimate a triple difference model for these decompositions – treating each state as if it
contained a “Black” state and a “White” state that were treated with NPND policies simultaneously. We also omit
Kentucky, Louisiana, and Oregon from our sample, as they change their policy in the middle of our sample.
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From these figures, we can see that the majority of our identification comes from “within”
variation and a comparison of treated states to never-treated states. The within variation comes
from partialling out the control variables; since the main variable of interest is the interaction of
Enrollment×Black, the non-interacted Enrollment-based policy indicator is a control variable that,
as should be expected, has high weight in the difference-in-differences design. The high weight
on comparisons of treated to never-treated states is also unsurprising, since 28 of the 45 states in
our sample were never treated with Enrollment-based policies. We also never have negative weight
placed on a 2x2 comparison, so our estimates are not threatened by negative weight bias. The ma-
jority of our treated vs. never-treated comparisons have similar weight, with only one comparison
truly standing out in all three figures – the 1998 timing group, with a weight of about 0.14 contain-
ing Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina.11 These three states are typical NPND states
– medium-sized Southern states with a mix of urban and rural population, and a large number of
Black teens. In addition, our results are not solely driven by this 2x2 comparison and the within
component of the decomposition – if anything, these two estimates are smaller than our overall es-
timated effect of Enrollment-based policies on Black teen employment, and may be slightly biasing
us toward zero if these 2x2 comparisons are indeed overweighted relative to the true population
effect.
Figure 4 shows six plots of the relevant difference-in-difference weights for young adults. On
the left are weights for White young adults, and on the right are weights for Black young adults.
These figures are similar to those for teens – a large “within” component, with the majority of the
remaining variation coming from never-treated vs. timing group comparisons. As with teens, the
largest weight corresponds to the 1998 timing group, with a weight of 0.086, with the 1996 and
1994 timing groups having similarly large weights of 0.062 and 0.054, respectively. For full-time
and overall employment, the “within” component and 1998 timing group are larger in magnitude
than the overall effect size for White young adults, but otherwise these figures show no reason for
11Since our controls and timing groups do not change, the weights in all 3 figures are identical – the only differences
between these three figures are in the 2x2 difference-in-differences estimates.
concern – again there are no negative weights, and no single 2x2 comparison dominates and drives
the overall effects shown in Table 5.
Next, we consider the reweighted balance test proposed by Goodman-Bacon (2018) – estimating
the relationship between different covariates in our regressions and the effective treatment status of
different state-year pairs. Since we have no negative weights, this is equivalent to a comparison of
means between treated and untreated state-year pairs, weighted by the 2x2 difference-in-difference
weights from Figures 3 and 4. Table 7 shows the results from this exercise.
The balance test shows a few significant differences between treated and untreated groups. In
the Black teen sample, treated groups have higher state average income and unemployment rates
than untreated groups. However, we find that Enrollment-based policies increase Black teen em-
ployment, so the above-average unemployment rate is likely dampening the true effects of the policy.
Similarly for young adults, treated White young adults have below-average unemployment, while
treated Black young adults have above-average unemployment, the opposite of our findings. Im-
portantly, there are no differences between treated and untreated groups in urbanicity. Overall,
the sample is somewhat imbalanced, but this imbalance is unlikely to create substantial bias in our
estimates.
Finally, we consider detrending our estimates. Given that, in particular, our event studies for
young adults have positive, occassionally significant pre-existing trends, removing a linear trend
from our main estimates is sensible. Goodman-Bacon (2018) provides a method for detrending that
removes pre-treatment trends in the outcome variable, grouped by timing group. The advantage
of this method over the more common inclusion of state-specific linear trends in our model is the
weights of each 2x2 difference-in-differences component remain unchanged via this method. We use
data only from the first three years of our sample, 1985-87, before any state enacted an Enrollment-
based policy, and estimate the model below:
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Employmentst = β0 + βk TGk × t+ δt + λs + θXs,t + εs,t (5)
In this equation, t represents calendar year, from 1985 to 1987, and TGk represents a dummy
variable for inclusion in “timing group” k. All other variables correspond to their counterparts in
Section 3.2. After this, we use the estimates to construct residuals from the whole sample, 1985-
2014. These residuals then become the outcome variable for our main regressions from Equations 1
and 2. This is a two-stage process for which the literature has not derived correct standard errors,
so in Tables 8 and 9 below, we will only focus on the direction of the effects, not on the magnitude
or statistical significance.
Both Tables 8 and 9 show similar patterns to what we observed in Tables 4 and 5, respectively.
White teen employment is largely unaffected by Enrollment-based policies, while Black teen em-
ployment is increased. In addition, White part-time employment for young adults is decreased,
while Black part-time employment is unaffected. The major difference between Tables 5 and 9
appears in full-time employment. Table 5 showed no effect on White young adult full-time employ-
ment, and an increase in Black young adult full-time employment. Table 9 shows a decrease in both
White and Black young adult full-time employment, leading to decreases in overall employment for
both groups. Due to this inconsistency, we hesitate to make strong claims about the effects of No
Pass, No Drive policies on young adult full-time employment, noting only that the NPND effects on
education have ambiguous implications for full-time employment as well; some young adults may
find it easier to obtain a full-time job as their educational attainment increases, but some young
adults may enter higher education and forego full-time work as a result.
4.4 Robustness Checks: Alternative Samples and Definitions
In the discussions above, we focus on the effects of NPND policies on youth labor markets be-
cause teens aged 15-17 are subject to the policies and young adults aged 18-25 were subject to the
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policies when they were teens. Some adults older than 25 may have also been directly affected by
NPND policies when they were in high school in states that have had a NPND policy for more than
8 years. Older adults, however, should be largely unaffected by NPND policies since they completed
high school before the enactment of NPND policies. Table A1 shows the effects of NPND policies
on employment of older adults aged 26-60. Column (5) shows that the full-time employment rate of
older Black and White adults is not affected by NPND policies. Unlike young adults, in Column (6)
we find older White adults’ part-time employment is unaffected, while older Black adults’ part-time
employment increases by 1.2 percentage points. Perhaps some of the part-time job vacancies in-
duced by higher educational attainment among White young adults are filled by older Black adults.
But most older adults are too old to have been directly affected by NPND policies, so full-time
employment remains unaffected.
In section 4.1 we analyze the effects of NPND policies on teen and young adult labor markets
separately. Our definition of teen employment is different from young adult employment because
the teen labor market is different from the conventional labor market. To show that our results
in section 4.1 are robust, Tables 11 and Table 12 report results on a pooled sample, including all
youths aged 15–25. The employment status of teens and young adults is defined using our definition
of teen employment in Table 11, and with our definition of young adult employment in Table 12.
Results in both tables show that NPND policies increase the full-time and part-time employment
of Black youths, and decrease White part-time employment. Overall, results on the pooled youth
sample are consistent with our findings in section 4.1.
5 Conclusion
No Pass, No Drive policies have unusual and important effects on teen labor markets. Black
teenagers are 4.9 percentage points more likely to hold part-time jobs after the implementation of
an NPND policy. These jobs appear to come from a reduction in part-time employment for White
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young adults. NPND policies reduce barriers keeping Black teens out of part-time employment,
without displacing White teens from part-time jobs. Importantly, these short-term effects on teen
employment can have long-term impacts on the dynamics of Black-White employment differentials.
As Black teens accumulate labor market experience at a younger age under NPND policies, unad-
justed Black-White wage and employment gaps should close. As a result, NPND policies can at
least partially aid in overcoming the stagnation in Black-White labor differentials we have observed
over the past 30-40 years.
Moving forward, our results suggest a few avenues for future research. First, do similar policies
affect teen Black-White labor differentials? Minimum wage laws, compulsory education, and other
policies affecting teen employment and/or educational choices may have similar effects to those
we show in this study. Second, how persistent are Black-White differentials in teen employment?
We show that the teen Black-White employment gap closes as a result of NPND policies; should
we expect this narrower gap to persist across the lifecycle? Overall, racial disparities in low-wage,
low-skill labor markets should be a more important and active area of research, and our findings
demonstrate that teen labor markets are an important and interesting area which policies should
target to eliminate racial employment gaps.
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12Teen parents are exempt from Alabama’s NPND policy.
13In the original version of this policy, Iowa had an exemption for working students. This exemption was removed
in 2005.
14Kentucky instituted this policy in 1990 in some counties; however, the law was struck down by the Kentucky
Supreme Court in 2003 (D.F. v Codell). A new law, identical to the original for the purposes of this research, was
implemented in 2007.
15Teens can be exempted from Virginia’s NPND policy with parental permission.
16Not all counties in Wisconsin enacted a NPND policy, and there is within-state variation in timing that is not
explored in this study.
17Delaware’s No Pass, No Drive law was repealed on August 29, 2018.
18Rhode Island has provisions to revoke the licenses of truant students and students who are suspended from
school. I categorize Rhode Island as both a Truancy-Based and Behavior-Based policy as a result.
19Louisiana and Oregon initially had Behavior-Based policies focusing on discipline, but then changed to
Enrollment-Based policies focusing on dropouts at a later date.
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Table 1: No Pass, No Drive Policies in the United States
State Name Policy Hardship/Working GED 2013 Min.
Enactment Year Exemption Exemption Dropout Age
Enrollment-Based
Alabama12 1993 Yes No 17
Arkansas 1989 Yes No 17
Florida 1997 Yes Yes 16
Georgia 1998 No No 16
Idaho 1996 No No 16
Illinois 2007 No No 17
Indiana 1991 Yes No 18
Iowa 1994 No13 No 16
Kentucky 1990, 200714 Yes No 16
Louisiana 2009 No No 18
Mississippi 1994 No No 17
North Carolina 1998 Yes No 16
Ohio 1992 No Yes 18
Oklahoma 1996 Yes No 18
Oregon 2000 No Yes 18
South Carolina 1998 No No 17
Tennessee 1990 No No 17
Texas 1995 No No 18
Virginia15 1996 No No 18
West Virginia 1988 No No 17
Wisconsin16 1988 No No 18
Truancy-Based
California 1992 No No 18
Delaware17 2000 Yes No 16
Nevada 2003 No No 18
New Mexico 2005 No Yes 18
Rhode Island18 2005 Yes No 18
Behavior-Based
Kansas 1999 No No 18
Louisiana 200419 No No 18
Oregon 199519 No Yes 18
Rhode Island 2005 Yes No 18
Notes: Policies are grouped by category. Enrollment-Based policies require that teens under the age of 18 must be
enrolled in school and regularly attending to hold a driver’s license. The states noted under columns “Hardship/Working
Exemption” and “GED Exemption” allow teens who can demonstrate they have sufficient hardship/full-time employment
or have received a high school diploma equivalent, respectively, to be exempt from the No Pass, No Drive Policy. Truancy-
Based policies require that teens subject to compulsory school attendance must attend school to hold a driver’s license;
these policies do not place any requirements on high school dropouts. Behavior-Based policies allow states to revoke the
licenses of teens who commit certain crimes, who commit crimes on school grounds, or who receive school suspensions or
expulsions, with the exact requirement varying by state.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics: Teens
Panel A: Teen Employment (aged 15-17)
Percent Overall Male Female White Black
Sample 100 51.19 48.81 80.58 12.06
Employed 27.38 26.38 28.43 30.21 14.52
Full-time 6.72 7.51 5.89 7.24 4.55
Part-time 20.67 18.88 22.54 22.94 9.97
Panel B: Teen Employment (aged 15-17) by High School Enrollment Status
High School Enrolled High School Dropout
Percent 93.08 6.92
Total White Black Total White Black
Employed 26.48 29.27 13.77 32.52 35.59 18.64
Full-time 5.18 5.53 3.74 21.2 23.39 10.95
Part-time 21.3 23.74 10.03 11.32 12.13 7.69
Panel C: State Time-Variant Characteristics
Yearly Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total Teen Population 389431 434122.1 25369 2834241
State Median Income 28994.86 11005.99 9940 70379
Unemployment rate 5.805 1.915 2.3 13.7
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for teens. Panel A reports statistics for teen employment, regardless of school
enrollment status. Panel B reports statistics for teen employment by school enrollment status. Panel C reports statistics
for teen population, state median income and unemployment rate. All statistics in Panels A and B are based on the total
teen population of the corresponding category.
27
Table 3: Summary Statistics: Young Adults
Panel A: Young Adult Employment (aged 18-25)
Percent Overall Male Female White Black
Sample 100 48.61 51.39 79.99 12.05
Employed 79.02 83.27 75.01 81.71 67.81
Full-time 54.39 62.59 46.64 56.57 46.47
Part-time 24.63 20.68 28.37 25.14 21.34
Panel B: Young Adult Employment (aged 18-25) by Educational Attainment
High School Graduate High School Dropout
Percent 83.89 16.11
Total White Black Total White Black
Employed 81.268 83.79 71.73 63.91 67.42 48.38
Full-time 54.24 56.66 56.66 47.16 50.76 31.10
Part-time 27.02 27.73 22.85 16.74 16.66 17.28
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for young adult employment (ages 18–25). Panel A reports summary statistics
for all young adults. Panel B reports summary statistics of young adult employment by educational attainment.
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Table 4: Teen Employment
All Teens Black vs. White Teens
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employed Full-time Part-time Employed Full-time Part-time
Enrollment 0.00489 -0.00251 0.00739 -0.00842 -0.00515 -0.00326
(0.00590) (0.00327) (0.00443) (0.00540) (0.00326) (0.00469)
Behavior 0.00750 -0.00449 0.0120∗ 0.00196 -0.00568 0.00765
(0.0101) (0.00610) (0.00704) (0.00746) (0.00585) (0.00633)
Truancy -0.00335 -0.000839 -0.00251 -0.00753 -0.00145 -0.00608
(0.0124) (0.00674) (0.0108) (0.0126) (0.00646) (0.0108)
Enrollment × black 0.0659∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0528∗∗∗
(0.00966) (0.00450) (0.00860)
Behavior × black 0.0358∗ 0.00756 0.0282
(0.0190) (0.00630) (0.0194)
Truancy × black 0.0454∗∗∗ 0.00720 0.0382∗∗∗
(0.0105) (0.00585) (0.0106)
Black -0.0101 0.00224 -0.0123 -0.0378∗∗∗ -0.00311 -0.0347∗∗∗
(0.0105) (0.00327) (0.00897) (0.0122) (0.00422) (0.0103)
Observations 191676 191676 191676 191676 191676 191676
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state. This table shows results from estimating Equations 1 (Columns 1–
3) and 2 (Columns 4–6) on teen employment. Columns (1)-(3) report the effects of NPND policies on total teen employment,
and Columns (4)-(6) report differential effects by race. The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (4) is an indicator for
employment in any job. The dependent variable in Columns (2) and (5) is an indicator for full-time employment (≥30
hours/week). The dependent variable in Columns (3) and (6) is an indicator for part-time employment (<30 hours/week). All
specifications control for state-level average annual income, unemployment rate, total teen population, urbanity, household
income, and state and year fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5: Young Adult Employment
Overall Black vs. White
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employed Full-time Part-time Employed Full-time Part-time
Enrollment -0.00166 0.0125 -0.0142∗∗∗ -0.0113∗∗ 0.00610 -0.0174∗∗∗
(0.00511) (0.00791) (0.00507) (0.00557) (0.00798) (0.00473)
Behavior 0.00695 0.0135∗ -0.00653 -0.00313 0.00440 -0.00752
(0.00661) (0.00744) (0.00735) (0.0110) (0.00862) (0.00724)
Truancy -0.00850 -0.00167 -0.00684 -0.0127∗ -0.00647 -0.00619
(0.00535) (0.00717) (0.00727) (0.00634) (0.00757) (0.00739)
Enrollment × black 0.0467∗∗∗ 0.0313∗∗∗ 0.0154∗∗
(0.00934) (0.00631) (0.00743)
Behavior × black 0.0563∗∗∗ 0.0508∗∗∗ 0.00547
(0.0181) (0.0136) (0.00958)
Truancy × black 0.0395∗∗∗ 0.0434∗∗∗ -0.00391
(0.0125) (0.00741) (0.00806)
Black 0.0380∗∗∗ 0.0462∗∗∗ -0.00824 0.0173∗ 0.0303∗∗∗ -0.0130
(0.00870) (0.00656) (0.00659) (0.00925) (0.00687) (0.00776)
Observations 395076 395076 395076 395076 395076 395076
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state. This table shows results from estimating Equations 1 (Columns
1–3) and 2 (Columns 4–6) on young adult employment. Columns (1)-(3) report the effects of NPND policies on total young
adult employment, and Columns (4)-(6) report differential effects by race. The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (4)
is an indicator for employment in any job. The dependent variable in Columns (2) and (5) is an indicator for full-time
employment (≥35 hours/week). The dependent variable in Columns (3) and (6) is an indicator for part-time employment
(<35 hours/week). All specifications control for state average annual income, young adult population, and state and year
fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: High School Dropout
Teens Young Adults
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enrollment -0.0136∗∗∗ -0.0109∗∗ -0.0256∗∗∗ -0.0146∗∗∗
(0.00453) (0.00438) (0.00610) (0.00542)
Behavior -0.00298 -0.00576 -0.00446 0.000925
(0.00455) (0.00541) (0.0106) (0.00907)
Truancy 0.00160 0.00231 0.00945∗ 0.0159∗∗∗
(0.00512) (0.00526) (0.00541) (0.00571)
Enrollment × black -0.0128∗ -0.0527∗∗∗
(0.00643) (0.0109)
Behavior × black 0.0165∗∗∗ -0.0318∗
(0.00610) (0.0175)
Truancy × black -0.00424 -0.0557∗∗∗
(0.00608) (0.0127)
Black -0.00546 -0.00151 0.0440∗∗∗ 0.0687∗∗∗
(0.00672) (0.00770) (0.0108) (0.0125)
Observations 187545 187545 362411 362411
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state. This table shows results from estimating Equations 1 and 2 on
the high school dropout status of teens (Columns 1 and 2) and young adults (Columns 3 and 4). Columns 2 and 4 show
differential effects by race. All specifications control for state average annual income, population, and state and year fixed
effects.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 7: Difference-in-Differences Reweighted Balance Test
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log Average log Household Urbanicity Unemployment
Income Income Rate
Black Teens
Effective Treatment 0.407∗∗∗ -0.0818 0.0188 0.703∗∗∗
(0.0748) (0.0871) (0.0354) (0.0791)
White Young Adults
Effective Treatment 0.0160 0.0469 -0.00713 -0.442∗∗∗
(0.0458) (0.0347) (0.0807) (0.137)
Black Young Adults
Effective Treatment -0.0126 -0.251∗∗∗ -0.0114 0.297∗∗∗
(0.0652) (0.0774) (0.0196) (0.0722)
Observations 3000 3000 3000 3000
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state. This table shows the reweighted balance test from Goodman-
Bacon (2018) for four of our main control variables: log(State Average Income) in column (1), log(Household Income) for
households in our estimation sample in column (2), state average urbanicity for households in our sample in column (3), and
state average unemployment rate in column (4). A point estimate of zero implies that treated and untreated groups have
balanced covariates, after weighting by the 2x2 difference-in-difference weights calculated previously. Statistically significant
point estimates imply an imbalanced sample, and are explained further in the text.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 8: Teen Regressions, Detrended
(1) (2) (3)
Employed Full-time Part-time
Enrollment 0.0261 -0.0131 0.0393
(0.0306) (0.0113) (0.0314)
Behavior 0.0112 -0.0280 0.0392
(0.0330) (0.0146) (0.0291)
Truancy -0.101 -0.0106 -0.0904
(0.0745) (0.0244) (0.0636)
Enrollment × Black 0.605 0.132 0.473
(0.255) (0.148) (0.236)
Behavior × Black 0.226 0.102 0.124
(0.190) (0.0677) (0.151)
Truancy × Black 0.00900 0.0347 -0.0257
(0.0594) (0.0384) (0.0749)
Black -0.118 -0.126 0.00870
(0.175) (0.0722) (0.168)
Observations 2820 2820 2820
Notes: Uncorrected robust second-stage standard errors in parentheses. This table shows the results of the second
stage of the two-step procedure for removing group-specific linear trends outlined in Goodman-Bacon (2018) for our main
teen regressions. Significance stars are omitted, as correct standard errors accounting for the two-step estimation for this
procedure have not been derived. As a result, we focus on the direction of these estimates instead of their magnitudes,
which are at times unrealistically large, but appear to have wide confidence intervals.
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Table 9: Young Adult Regressions, Detrended
Overall Black vs. White
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employed Full-time Part-time Employed Full-time Part-time
Enrollment -0.311 -0.242 -0.0697 -0.141 -0.0753 -0.0658
(0.0642) (0.0773) (0.0514) (0.0240) (0.0245) (0.0280)
Behavior 0.0723 0.0443 0.0281 -0.0323 -0.0122 -0.0201
(0.0367) (0.0489) (0.0414) (0.0351) (0.0399) (0.0222)
Truancy 0.0200 0.137 -0.117 0.0254 0.0647 -0.0393
(0.0505) (0.0653) (0.0543) (0.0337) (0.0572) (0.0725)
Enrollment × Black -0.281 -0.400 0.118
(0.188) (0.231) (0.264)
Behavior × Black 0.208 -0.00604 0.214
(0.0810) (0.164) (0.231)
Truancy × Black -0.0594 0.102 -0.162
(0.0531) (0.0622) (0.0540)
Black 0.0796 -0.292 0.372 0.189 -0.415 0.604
(0.162) (0.196) (0.101) (0.134) (0.161) (0.119)
Observations 2744 2744 2744 2744 2744 2744
Notes: Uncorrected robust second-stage standard errors in parentheses. This table shows the results of the second
stage of the two-step procedure for removing group-specific linear trends outlined in Goodman-Bacon (2018) for our main
teen regressions. Significance stars are omitted, as correct standard errors accounting for the two-step estimation for this
procedure have not been derived. As a result, we focus on the direction of these estimates instead of their magnitudes,
which are at times unrealistically large, but appear to have wide confidence intervals.
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Table 10: Employment of Adults (Aged 26-60)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Enrollment -0.00586∗∗ -0.00443 -0.00142 -0.00741∗∗ -0.00336 -0.00404
(0.00278) (0.00391) (0.00251) (0.00324) (0.00426) (0.00261)
Behavior -0.00436 -0.00202 -0.00234 -0.00740∗ -0.00438 -0.00302
(0.00354) (0.00238) (0.00267) (0.00405) (0.00355) (0.00277)
Truancy -0.00337 -0.00349 0.000117 -0.00214 -0.00241 0.000275
(0.00235) (0.00371) (0.00304) (0.00252) (0.00342) (0.00304)
Enrollment × black 0.00930 -0.00632 0.0156∗∗∗
(0.00729) (0.00813) (0.00401)
Behavior × black 0.0210∗∗ 0.0161 0.00491
(0.0101) (0.0114) (0.00506)
Truancy × black -0.00848 -0.00858 0.0000962
(0.00861) (0.00816) (0.00366)
Black 0.0387∗∗∗ 0.0474∗∗∗ -0.00864∗∗∗ 0.0355∗∗∗ 0.0496∗∗∗ -0.0142∗∗∗
(0.00724) (0.00812) (0.00286) (0.00731) (0.00819) (0.00376)
Observations 1933693 1933693 1933693 1933693 1933693 1933693
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state. This table shows results from estimating Equations 1 (Columns
1–3) and 2 (Columns 4–6) on older adult employment (ages 26–60). Columns (1)–(3) report the effects of NPND policies on
total older adult employment, and Columns (4)–(6) report differential effects by race. The dependent variable in Columns
(1) and (4) is an indicator for employment in any job. The dependent variable in Columns (2) and (5) is an indicator
for full-time employment (≥35 hours/week). The dependent variable in Columns (3) and (6) is an indicator for part-time
employment (<35 hours/week). All specifications control for state average annual income, young adult population, and
state and year fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 11: Employment of Teen and Young Adults: With Teen Definition
Overall Black vs. White
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employed Full-time Part-time Employed Full-time Part-time
Enrollment 0.00639 0.00928 -0.00289 -0.00409 0.00385 -0.00795∗∗∗
(0.00584) (0.00566) (0.00264) (0.00651) (0.00620) (0.00244)
Behavior 0.00727 0.00462 0.00265 -0.00480 -0.00390 -0.000903
(0.00888) (0.00813) (0.00280) (0.00977) (0.00839) (0.00358)
Truancy -0.00852 -0.00502 -0.00350 -0.0121∗ -0.00783 -0.00426
(0.00704) (0.00709) (0.00425) (0.00661) (0.00706) (0.00380)
Enrollment × black 0.0514∗∗∗ 0.0268∗∗∗ 0.0246∗∗∗
(0.00795) (0.00583) (0.00507)
Behavior × black 0.0696∗∗∗ 0.0492∗∗∗ 0.0205∗
(0.0199) (0.00935) (0.0118)
Truancy × black 0.0386∗∗∗ 0.0292∗∗∗ 0.00935
(0.0124) (0.00628) (0.00750)
Black 0.0252∗∗∗ 0.0436∗∗∗ -0.0184∗∗∗ 0.00215 0.0302∗∗∗ -0.0281∗∗∗
(0.00851) (0.00495) (0.00581) (0.00946) (0.00586) (0.00659)
Observations 586752 586752 586752 586752 586752 586752
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state. This table shows results from estimating Equations 1 (Columns
1–3) and 2 (Columns 4–6) on all youth employment (ages 15–25), using our teen employment definitions. In this table, a
person is employed if they worked at least 16 weeks in the prior year, and must work at least 30 hours per week to achieve
full-time status. Columns (1)–(3) report the effects of NPND policies on youth employment, and Columns (4)–(6) report
differential effects by race. The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (4) is an indicator for employment in any job. The
dependent variable in Columns (2) and (5) is an indicator for full-time employment (≥30 hours/week). The dependent
variable in Columns (3) and (6) is an indicator for part-time employment (<30 hours/week). All specifications control for
state average annual income, young adult population, and state and year fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 12: Employment of Teen and Young Adults: With Adult Definition
Overall Black vs. White
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employed Full-time Part-time Employed Full-time Part-time
Enrollment -0.00391 0.00618 -0.0101∗∗ -0.0161∗∗ 0.000614 -0.0167∗∗∗
(0.00557) (0.00616) (0.00415) (0.00612) (0.00630) (0.00405)
Behavior -0.000345 0.00608 -0.00642 -0.0101 -0.000108 -0.00997
(0.00714) (0.00627) (0.00538) (0.0104) (0.00645) (0.00655)
Truancy -0.00756 -0.00138 -0.00618 -0.0113 -0.00495 -0.00633
(0.00734) (0.00682) (0.00594) (0.00773) (0.00693) (0.00579)
Enrollment × black 0.0593∗∗∗ 0.0274∗∗∗ 0.0319∗∗∗
(0.00785) (0.00436) (0.00624)
Behavior × black 0.0566∗∗∗ 0.0363∗∗∗ 0.0203
(0.0195) (0.00877) (0.0136)
Truancy × black 0.0386∗∗∗ 0.0339∗∗∗ 0.00469
(0.00906) (0.00499) (0.00939)
Black 0.0239∗∗∗ 0.0343∗∗∗ -0.0104 -0.00113 0.0208∗∗∗ -0.0220∗∗∗
(0.00853) (0.00463) (0.00683) (0.00891) (0.00506) (0.00787)
Observations 586752 586752 586752 586752 586752 586752
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state. This table shows results from estimating Equations 1 (Columns
1–3) and 2 (Columns 4–6) on all youth employment (ages 15–25), using our young adult employment definitions. In this
table, a person is employed if they are currently working, and must usually work at least 35 hours per week to achieve
full-time status. Columns (1)–(3) report the effects of NPND policies on youth employment, and Columns (4)–(6) report
differential effects by race. The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (4) is an indicator for employment in any job. The
dependent variable in Columns (2) and (5) is an indicator for full-time employment (≥35 hours/week). The dependent
variable in Columns (3) and (6) is an indicator for part-time employment (<35 hours/week). All specifications control for
state average annual income, young adult population, and state and year fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 1: Event Study Graphs: Racial differences in Teen Employment
(a) Table 4, Column (4) racial differences in overall
teen employment
(b) Table 4, Column (5) racial differences in teen full-
time jobs
(c) Table 4, Column (6) racial differences in teen part-time jobs
Notes: These event study graphs estimate dynamic difference-in-differences models, and are labeled with the specific
coefficient tested.
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Figure 2: Event Study Graphs: Young Adult Employment
(a) Table 5, Column (4) racial differences in overall young adult employment
(b) Table 5, Column (5) racial differences in young adult full-time jobs
(c) Table 5, Column (6) racial differences in young adult part-time jobs
Notes: These event study graphs estimate dynamic difference-in-differences models, and are labeled with the specific
coefficient tested.
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Notes: These figures show the 2x2 Difference-in-differences weights, plotted against their corresponding effect, for each of
our Black teen regressions.
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Figure 4: 2x2 Difference-in-Differences Weights, Enrollment-Based Policy Young Adults
(a) All Employment, White Adults (b) All Employment, Black Adults
(c) Full-Time Employment, White Adults (d) Full-Time Employment, Black Adults
(e) Part-Time Employment, White Adults (f) Part-Time Employment, Black Adults
Notes: These figures show the 2x2 Difference-in-differences weights, plotted against their corresponding effect, for each of
our main young adult regressions.
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Appendices
A Additional Tables and Figures
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Table A1: Adult (Aged 26-60) Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Enrollment -0.00586∗∗ -0.00443 -0.00142 -0.00741∗∗ -0.00336 -0.00404
(0.00278) (0.00391) (0.00251) (0.00324) (0.00426) (0.00261)
Behavior -0.00436 -0.00202 -0.00234 -0.00740∗ -0.00438 -0.00302
(0.00354) (0.00238) (0.00267) (0.00405) (0.00355) (0.00277)
Truancy -0.00337 -0.00349 0.000117 -0.00214 -0.00241 0.000275
(0.00235) (0.00371) (0.00304) (0.00252) (0.00342) (0.00304)
Enrollment × black 0.00930 -0.00632 0.0156∗∗∗
(0.00729) (0.00813) (0.00401)
Behavior × black 0.0210∗∗ 0.0161 0.00491
(0.0101) (0.0114) (0.00506)
Truancy × black -0.00848 -0.00858 0.0000962
(0.00861) (0.00816) (0.00366)
Black 0.0387∗∗∗ 0.0474∗∗∗ -0.00864∗∗∗ 0.0355∗∗∗ 0.0496∗∗∗ -0.0142∗∗∗
(0.00724) (0.00812) (0.00286) (0.00731) (0.00819) (0.00376)
Observations 1933693 1933693 1933693 1933693 1933693 1933693
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state. All specifications control for state average annual income, teen
population, and state and year fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2: Adult (Aged 19-60) Employment
Overall Black vs. White
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employed Full-time Part-time Employed Full-time Part-time
Enrollment -0.00484∗ -0.000683 -0.00415 -0.00771∗∗ -0.000593 -0.00711∗∗
(0.00288) (0.00430) (0.00282) (0.00336) (0.00459) (0.00278)
Behavior -0.00315 -0.000367 -0.00278 -0.00700∗ -0.00297 -0.00403
(0.00270) (0.00263) (0.00312) (0.00409) (0.00360) (0.00336)
Truancy -0.00429∗ -0.00407 -0.000227 -0.00406 -0.00418 0.000123
(0.00252) (0.00353) (0.00332) (0.00289) (0.00327) (0.00339)
Enrollment × black 0.0167∗∗ -0.000247 0.0169∗∗∗
(0.00688) (0.00725) (0.00393)
Behavior × black 0.0264∗∗ 0.0179∗ 0.00847∗∗
(0.0107) (0.0103) (0.00348)
Truancy × black 0.00218 0.00341 -0.00123
(0.00865) (0.00700) (0.00351)
Black 0.0356∗∗∗ 0.0405∗∗∗ -0.00491∗ 0.0286∗∗∗ 0.0395∗∗∗ -0.0109∗∗∗
(0.00639) (0.00639) (0.00282) (0.00668) (0.00655) (0.00352)
Observations 2328769 2328769 2328769 2328769 2328769 2328769
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state. All specifications control for state average annual income, teen
population, and state and year fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure A1: Event Study Graphs: Teens
(a) Table 4, Column (1) Enrollment Effects (b) Table 4, Column (2) Enrollment Effects
(c) Table 4, Column (3) Enrollment Effects
Notes: These event study graphs estimate dynamic difference-in-differences models, and are labeled with the specific
coefficient tested.
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Figure A2: Event Study Graphs: Young Adult
(a) Table 5, Column (1) Enrollment Effects (b) Table 5, Column (2) Enrollment Effects
(c) Table 5, Column (3) Enrollment Effects
Notes: These event study graphs estimate dynamic difference-in-differences models, and are labeled with the specific
coefficient tested.
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